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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-4524 
____________ 
 
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
FLEMING STEEL COMPANY; SETH KOHN; KENDA KOHN, 
 
            Appellants 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-06-cv-00829) 
District Judge:  Honorable William L. Standish 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2011 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  July 25, 2011 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Fleming Steel Co. (“Fleming Steel”) appeals an order of the District Court 
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Continental Casualty Company 
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(“Continental Casualty”), on claims arising from a U.S. Navy construction contract.  For 
the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
I. 
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our 
analysis. 
This case represents the remnants of a dispute over a construction contract at the 
Oceana Naval Air Station in Virginia Beach, Virginia.  W.M. Schlosser Company, Inc. 
(“Schlosser”), was the prime contractor for construction of an acoustical aircraft 
enclosure or “hush house” for the Oceana project.  Schlosser subcontracted work on the 
hush house’s “acoustical intake sliding doors” to Fleming Steel.  As required by the 
subcontract, Fleming Steel procured a performance bond, issued by Continental Casualty, 
to guarantee the quality of its work on the project.  The performance bond, prepared by 
Schlosser, identified Fleming Steel as the principal on the bond with Continental 
Casualty as the surety. 
According to Fleming Steel’s President, Seth Kohn, the performance bond was not 
to include any indemnification provision covering attorneys’ fees.1  Mr. Kohn testified 
that he instructed Joseph A. Corriere, employee of Continental Casualty, not to include 
language covering attorneys’ fees in the agreement.  The performance bond, however, did 
                                                 
1
 Mr. Kohn testified that the performance bond was to be consistent with the 
original subcontract, which did not contain any provision with regard to attorneys’ fees. 
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include such language, stating that, in the event Fleming failed to “well and truly 
perform” its subcontract with Schlosser [Continental Casualty], “shall indemnify and 
save harmless [Schlosser] from any and all loss, damage, and expense, including costs 
and attorneys’ fees” that Schlosser may sustain by reason of Fleming Steel’s default on 
the subcontract.  (App. at 36.)  Despite the inclusion of this language, Mr. Kohn reviewed 
the terms and signed the one-page agreement.
2
 
In 2002 Schlosser terminated its subcontract with Fleming Steel for the Oceana 
project due to Fleming Steel’s failure to construct the acoustical intake sliding doors in 
accordance with contract specifications.  Litigation ensued.  Fleming Steel was ultimately 
found liable for breaching the subcontract and judgment was entered against Fleming 
Steel.  Per the terms of the performance bond, Continental Casualty paid the Schlosser 
judgment which included a separate award of attorneys’ fees.  Consequently, Continental 
Casualty issued a demand in the District Court on Fleming Steel under the terms of the 
parties’ General Agreement of Indemnity (“GAI”).  In paragraph 2, the GAI provided: 
The Indemnitors [Fleming Steel] will indemnify and save [Continental 
Casualty] harmless from and against every claim, demand, liability, cost, 
charge, suit, judgment and expense which [Continental Casualty] may pay 
or incur in consequence of having executed, or procured the execution of 
such bonds, or any renewals or continuations thereof or substitute therefore, 
including, but not limited to, fees of attorneys, whether on salary, retainer 
or otherwise, and the expense of procuring, or attempting to procure, 
                                                 
2
 According to Mr. Kohn, he reviewed the performance bond agreement to the 
“best of [his] ability” and did not realize that, contrary to his alleged agreement with Mr. 
Corriere, the performance bond included a provision allowing Schlosser to recover for 
attorneys’ fees.  (App. at 147.) (verified statement of Seth Kohn). 
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release from liability, or in bringing suit to enforce the obligation of any of 
the Indemnitors under this Agreement. 
 
(App. at 31.)  Fleming Steel did not object to Continental Casualty’s indemnification 
claim in its entirety.  Rather, its objection was limited to Continental Casualty’s request 
for indemnification with respect to the award of attorneys’ fees, and costs and interest on 
those attorneys’ fees, issued in favor of Schlosser under the terms of the performance 
bond. 
In November 2010, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Continental Casualty and against Fleming Steel in the amount of $499,522.61, 
determining that the amount was due under the terms of the GAI.  Fleming Steel timely 
appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, 
and we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment “is plenary, and we apply the same standard 
as the District Court.”  Busch v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., 567 F.3d 89, 95 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 
appropriate when the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact” and when the moving party “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see G-I Holdings Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 
2009).  “To survive summary judgment, a non-movant must present sufficient evidence 
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to allow a reasonable jury to find in its favor.”  Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d at 253 
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
III. 
 Fleming Steel raises three issues on appeal.  First, it contends that the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Continental Casualty because 
genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to whether Continental Casualty acted 
in bad faith by including a provision for attorneys’ fees in the performance bond.  
Second, Fleming Steel contends that the District Court incorrectly determined that 
attorneys’ fees were a recoverable damage element in favor of Continental Casualty in 
light of the exclusion of attorneys’ fees in Fleming Steel’s underlying subcontract with 
Schlosser.  Third, and finally, Fleming Steel argues that the language of the GAI was 
ambiguous, and therefore, the District Court erred in not sending the issue to a jury.  We 
will address each contention in turn. 
A.  Bad Faith 
Courts recognize an exception to the general rule of enforcement of a principal’s 
liability for a surety’s payment to an obligee under a performance bond when there has 
been bad faith or fraudulent payment.  See Fid. & Deposit Co. v. Bristol Steel & Iron 
Works, Inc., 722 F.2d 1160, 1163 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Pennsylvania law).
3
  
                                                 
3
 The District Court held that Pennsylvania contract law applies, a holding the 
parties do not dispute on appeal.  Continental Cas. Co. v. Fleming Steel Co., 2010 WL 
4668955, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2010). 
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Accordingly, a properly supported claim of fraud or bad faith acts as a defense and 
creates a genuine issue of material fact.  U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Feibus, 15 F. Supp. 2d 
579, 585 (M.D. Pa. 1998). 
On appeal, Fleming Steel argues Continental Casualty acted in bad faith by 
ignoring Mr. Kohn’s instruction to omit attorneys’ fees language in the performance 
bond, and then subsequently failing to contact Schlosser directly in order to delete the 
attorneys’ fees provision.  As evidence, Fleming Steel submits testimony from Kohn 
recalling correspondences he had with Corriere indicating his desire to strike the 
provision covering legal fees in the performance bond agreement. 
Under Pennsylvania law, bad faith requires a showing of dishonest purpose or 
improper motive by “clear and convincing evidence.”  Klinger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 895 F. Supp. 709, 713 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Brown v. Progressive Ins. Co., 860 
A.2d 493, 500 (Pa. Super. 2004).  Gross negligence or bad judgment is insufficient to 
amount to bad faith.  Klinger, 895 F. Supp. at 714.  Here, the evidence fails to 
demonstrate anything other than negligence.  See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“[T]he determination of whether a given factual dispute requires 
submission to a jury must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to 
the case.”).  As a surety, Continental Casualty had no financial incentive to include the 
attorneys’ fee language in the performance bond.  Any obligation to pay attorneys’ fees 
in the event of a breach exposed both parties in this dispute to increased damages.  
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Furthermore, Schlosser, not Continental Casualty, prepared the performance bond, which 
Kohn subsequently reviewed and signed, without any objection to the attorneys’ fees 
provision.  These facts do not imply Continental Casualty acted dishonestly, or was 
attempting to conceal the attorneys’ fees provision from Fleming Steel prior to executing 
the agreement.  To the contrary, the evidence here suggests negligence, not bad faith, on 
behalf of Continental Casualty.  See, e.g., Engbrock v. Fed. Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 784, 785-
87 (5th Cir. 1967) (allegations that surety made excessive payments at most alleges 
negligence); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Nizdil, 709 F. Supp. 975, 976-77 (D. Or. 1989) 
(allegation that surety overpaid claim failed to raise an issue of material fact that would 
preclude summary judgment). 
Accordingly, no reasonable juror could conclude that Continental Casualty acted 
in bad faith when it permitted the performance bond to include a provision for attorneys’ 
fees. 
B.  Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees 
On appeal, Fleming Steel argues that the original subcontract with Schlosser, not 
the GAI or the performance bond, should govern the scope of its liability to Continental 
Casualty.  This argument is premised on the proposition that “the liability of the surety is 
no greater than that of its principal.”  See Exton Drive-In. Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 261 
A.2d 319, 325 (Pa. 1969) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).  In other 
words, Fleming Steel submits that a surety should not, as a matter of law, have the ability 
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to obligate its principal beyond what the principal has agreed to in the underlying 
contract.  This argument is unpersuasive. 
It is true that, under Pennsylvania law, “the liability of a surety is coextensive with 
that of the principal, and accordingly, a surety is bound to perform whatever may be 
legally required of its principal.”  Diversified Utilities Sales, Inc. v. Monte Fusco 
Excavating Contracting Co., 71 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1976).  However, it is equally 
well-established that when determining whether a surety is liable for certain types of 
damages, the bond is the proper place to start because the true intent and meaning of the 
bond instrument, not the underlying contractor agreement, is the primary determinant of 
the extent of liability.  Salvino Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. Fletcher & Sons, 580 A.2d 
853, 856 (Pa. 1990). 
As previously discussed, the performance bond in this case undoubtedly provides 
for the recovery of attorneys’ fees in the event of a default by Fleming.  The bond was 
signed by Kohn and the evidence does not indicate bad faith with regard to the inclusion 
of the attorneys’ fees provision.  The GAI simply reinforces Fleming Steel’s obligation to 
save Continental Casualty “harmless for every suit and judgment and expense which 
[Surety] may pay or incur in consequence of the Surety’s execution of bonds including 
but not limited to fees of attorneys . . .”  (App. at 31.)  Thus by the terms of both the 
performance bond and the GAI, Fleming Steel was responsible for the payment of 
attorneys’ fees in the event of a default on the underlying subcontract with Schlosser.  
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The fact that the subcontract with Schlosser itself did not include an attorneys’ fees 
provision is largely irrelevant given the explicit terms of the performance bond. 
C.  Ambiguity in the Language of the GAI 
Finally, Fleming Steel argues that the language of the GAI is ambiguous, and 
therefore, the issue of attorneys’ fees must go to a jury.  Specifically, Fleming Steel 
maintains that the attorneys’ fees referenced in the GAI relate exclusively to Continental 
Casualty’s in-house attorneys’ fees that are incurred pursuing the indemnity action, not 
attorneys’ fees related to the award of a judgment.  The language of the GAI does not 
support such a conclusion. 
“The construction of an indemnity contract is a question of law for the court to 
decide.”4  Jacobs Contractors, Inc. v. NPS Energy Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 371 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 1986)).  Under 
Pennsylvania contract law, “[w]here the intention of the parties is clear, there is no need 
to resort to extrinsic aids or evidence, instead, the meaning of a clear and unequivocal 
written contract must be determined by its contents alone.”  Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. 
v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 92 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  “[W]here language is clear and unambiguous, the focus of 
interpretation is upon the terms of the agreement as manifestly expressed, rather than as, 
                                                 
4
 In Pennsylvania, an indemnity agreement is to be construed using the law 
applicable to contracts generally.  Ratti v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 
695, 702 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
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perhaps, silently intended.”  Id. at 92-3 (emphasis in original).  Accordingly, because 
Pennsylvania presumes that the writing conveys the parties’ intent, a contract 
will be found ambiguous if, and only if, it is reasonably or fairly susceptible 
of different constructions and is capable of being understood in more senses 
than one and is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression or 
has a double meaning.  A contract is not ambiguous if the court can 
determine its meaning without any guide other than a knowledge of the 
simple facts on which, from the nature of the language in general, its 
meaning depends; and a contract is not rendered ambiguous by the mere 
fact that the parties do not agree on the proper construction.  To determine 
whether ambiguity exists in a contract, the court may consider the words of 
the contract, the alternative meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature 
of the objective evidence to be offered in support of that meaning. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 Here, paragraph 2 of the GAI provides that Fleming Steel will indemnify and save 
Continental Casualty harmless 
from and against every claim, demand, liability, cost, charge, suit, judgment 
and expense which [Continental Casualty] may pay or incur in consequence 
of having executed, or procured the execution of such bonds, or any 
renewals or continuations thereof or substitute thereof, including, but not 
limited to, fees of attorneys, whether on salary, retainer or otherwise, and 
the expense of procuring, or attempting to procure, release from liability, or 
in bringing suit to enforce the obligation of any of the Indemnitors under 
this Agreement. 
 
(App. at 31.)  This language broadly covers any cost, charge, judgment or expense that is 
a consequence of Continental Casualty having issued the performance bond.  The costs of 
the judgment against Fleming Steel would include attorneys’ fees incurred on behalf of 
Fleming Steel in defending the claims advanced by Schlosser.  Indeed, the attorneys’ fees 
at issue here were part of the judgment in favor of Schlosser.  This language does not 
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warrant the narrow interpretation advanced by Fleming Steel.  To the contrary, paragraph 
2 encompasses a comprehensive obligation on behalf of Fleming Steel to indemnify 
Continental Casualty.  The language of paragraph 2 does not qualify, or otherwise 
provide exceptions to this obligation.  Thus, we do not find Fleming Steel’s narrow 
interpretation of paragraph 2 to be a reasonable one. 
IV. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
